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Design change to spoiler actuator

Flug
Nr. máls: M-00513/AIG-04
Staða máls: Lokuð
13.08.2015

Tillaga í öryggisátt

The Icelandic Transportation Safety Board (ITSB) recommends to Moog, in co-operation with the airplane’s manufacturer, set up a program to support fleet wide replacement of the blocking and thermal relief valve housing with the fatigue improved unit made from stainless steel.

Afgreiðsla

Moog has redesigned the Blocking and Thermal Relief Valve Housing with thicker material section and more radius in the area of the fracture surface. The redesigned Blocking and Thermal Relief Valve Housing is made from stainless steel instead of aluminum. This results in better fatigue performance of the Blocking and Thermal Relief Valve Housing. In addition the FAA has issued Safety Recommendation 15.115, a Boeing 757 airplane level safety issue, mandating evaluation of the spoiler actuator's blocking and thermal relief valve housing failure to determine appropriate corrective action.

Design of pulley fastener locking

Flug
Nr. máls: M-01913/AIG-14
Staða máls: Lokuð
06.08.2015

Tillaga í öryggisátt

The Icelandic Transportation Safety Board (ITSB) recommends to Technify Motors to reconsider the design of the crankshaft belt pulley fastener P/N 05-7223-K000501 in order to prevent loosening of the fastener.

Afgreiðsla

Technify Motors reconsidered the design of the crankshaft belt pulley fastener P/N 05- 7223-K000501 in order to prevent loosening of the fastener and provided a report to EASA. In the report different options of locking mechanism were considered. The preferred solution was to mark the bolt with torque seal and decided to implement it. This way, the security of the correct sit of the crankshaft main bolt could be checked during inspections, to see if it was loosening over time.

EASA mandate of design change to cargo door due to maximum wind operation loading

Flug
Nr. máls: M-00511/AIG-05
Staða máls: Lokuð
10.04.2014

Tillaga í öryggisátt

The Icelandic Transportation Safety Board (ITSB) recommends to EASA that it require the STC holder of EASA STC EASA.IM.A.S.01423 to review the structural design of the main cargo door with respect to the 45 knots maximum wind operation loading and make the necessary design changes in order to meet the requirements of EASA CS, subchapters 25.301(a) and 25.303.

Afgreiðsla

The STC holder addressed through service bulletin (SB) PC-757-52-0018 a redesign of the cargo door, replacing the aluminum rods of the door with steel rods.

In addition, for both configurations, pre and post SB PC-757-52-0018, the following wind/gust limitations have been established and incorporated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and Operations Manual supplements:

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 0 (zero) knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration pre SB PC-757-52-0018 (aluminum rods).

- 45 knots up to the door canopy position, 25 knots beyond the door canopy position, for configuration post SB PC-757-52-0018 (steel rods).

These design changes and wind/gust limitations were mandated by the FAA AD 2016-04-24, which has been adopted by EASA.

 

 

Endurskoðun á notkun á olíuleiðslum

Flug
Nr. máls: 22-053F007
Staða máls: Opin
27.04.2023

Tillaga í öryggisátt

RNSA beinir því til hönnuðar I.C.P. Savannah S að endurskoða notkun á rifluðu málmrörunum í olíukerfi [Rotax 912] hreyfilsins.

Afgreiðsla

Endurskoðun fjarskiptatíðna

Flug
Nr. máls: M-00713/AIG-06
Staða máls: Lokuð
20.04.2015

Tillaga í öryggisátt

RNSA leggur til að Samgöngustofa endurskoði núgildandi fyrirkomulag Austursvæðis og Sandskeiðs með tilliti til fjarskiptatíðna.

Afgreiðsla

Samgöngustofa setti af stað verkefni um endurskipulagningu svæða og sjónflugsumferðar fyrir austan BIRK. Reglur um breytta tilhögun sjónflugs í Austursvæði og austur af BIRK tóku gildi 1. júní 2016. Hin breytta tilhögun er byggð á hættugreiningu og áhættumati sem unnið var af Isavia að beiðni SGS. Flugumferðarstjórar sem og notendur loftrýmis (m.a. einkaflugmenn, prófdómarar, þyrluflugmenn) tóku þátt í þeirri vinnu og SGS stýrði síðan úrvinnslu lokatillagna, sem aftur voru rýndar af SGS og tryggði SGS að sömu aðilar kæmu ekki að úrvinnslu tillagna og rýni.

Eftirfarandi breytingar má finna í AIP, sjá hér.

Endurskoðun verklags vegna tilkynninga til RNSA

Flug
Nr. máls: M-03614/AIG-27
Staða máls: Opin
01.11.2018

Tillaga í öryggisátt

RNSA beinir því til Blue West Helicopter að fyrirtækið enduskoði verklag sitt til að tryggja að tilkynningar flugslysa og alvarlegra flugatvika á loftförum þess á Íslandi berist án ástæðulausrar tafar til Rannsóknarnefndar samgönguslysa.

Afgreiðsla

Óafgreitt af Blue West Helicopters.

Endurskoðun verklags vegna veikinda/slys/frestun viðhalds

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði verklag á viðhaldssviði (production planning) þegar veikindi/slys/frestun viðhalds og annað komi upp, til þess að tryggja nægilegan fjölda flugvirkja með viðeigandi réttindi, fyrir uppsett verk.

Afgreiðsla

The following actions have been taken by AIC to clarify role and responsibility of Shift Supervisor with the aim to prevent similar occurrence. With update of the procedure, emphasis is placed on how to address unforeseen circumstances and take control of situations that may arise such as, sick leave, AOG etc.

CAME 1.4.8.2 has been updated in CAME rev. 50, to include the following regarding Shift Supervisor role and responsibility:

He is responsible for production and the safety of his assigned shift and personnel and ensure that sufficient personnel is available to carry out required maintenance tasks.

The following will also be added for further clarification:

  • Reschedule shift personnel in case of unforeseen circumstances e.g. AOG and sick leave, to ensure that sufficient authorised and qualified manpower is available to carry out scheduled maintenance.

All shift supervisors currently working for AIC have been briefed on this and are well aware of their role and responsibility with this in mind.

Endurskoðun verklagsreglna vegna heimilda til aksturs og flugtaks þegar tvær flugbrautir eru í notkun

Flug
Nr. máls: M-03614/AIG-27
Staða máls: Lokuð
01.11.2018

Tillaga í öryggisátt

RNSA beinir því til Isavia að fyrirtækið endurskoði verklagsreglur flugumferðarstjóra varðandi heimildar til aksturs í brautarstöðu og heimildar til flugtaks þegar tvær flugbrautir sem skerast eru í notkun. 

Endurskoðun þjálfun starfsfólks í viðhaldi flugvéla

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði þjálfun starfsfólks, til þess að tryggja að starfsfólk sem kemur að viðhaldi flugvéla, hver sem staða þess er, fái viðeigandi þjálfun og hafi þekkingu á sínu hlutverki og skyldum. Undir þetta fellur að starfsfólki á að vera ljóst hverjar heimildir þess eru (authorized staff) eða takmarkanir (un-authorized staff).

Afgreiðsla

Training for maintenance personnel has been reviewed. Initial training for employees will include overview of privileges as well as limitations set forth for Mechanics and Technicians in CAME and regulations.

Procedures in CAME have been reviewed with this in mind, and CAME 2.10 and roles and responsibilities in 1.4 have been updated in rev. 50 with a clear definition of the different limitations. The line between Mechanic and Technician has been made clear to make sure every employee knows their limitations.

List 1.6.0 Company Staff and Authorization list will be re-issued to include all maintenance personnel and certifying staff will be re-issued to include all employees with limitations and privileges presented to make it clearer. E.g. currently the list does not contain Non Part-66 Mechanics, Airworthiness Review Staff and office personnel. In next revision this will all be added to the same list to have a clear overview for all personnel.

Training Material will be distributed to all personnel when CAME revision 50 has been accepted by ICETRA, with a special focus on Mechanics and Technicians.

Endurskoðun þjálfun yfirmanna og viðhaldsvotta

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði þjálfun yfirmanna og viðhaldsvotta á viðhaldssviði til að tryggt sé að viðhaldshandbók félagsins sé fylgt (CAME 2.28 og 2.25).

Afgreiðsla

During review of CAME procedures 2.28 and 2.25 with reference to training for Maintenance personnel (both Management and CRS) the following was identified; need to increase and make the training more clear with regards to critical task and independent inspection.

Air Iceland Connect has conducted the following to ensure that maintenance personnel (both management and CRS) are trained up to standard and adhere to procedure.

  • Shift supervisors have been trained in handling of Critical tasks and production planning procedures.
  • CAME 2.23 has been updated in rev. 50 to make sure that the performance of Independent Inspection is clear.

Furthermore, the training material has been reviewed and the following actions taken;

  • Recurrent Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include why Regulation (EU 1321/2014) article 145.A.48 came into effect, including the accidents that led to it.
  • Initial Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include recent incident findings related to Independent Inspection.

Currently, important information, best practices and recent incident findings, actions, root cause and mitigation implemented to prevent re-occurrence is distributed during Technical Safety Seminars held twice a year, that course will remain as practiced.