2019

Endurskoðun verklags vegna veikinda/slys/frestun viðhalds

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði verklag á viðhaldssviði (production planning) þegar veikindi/slys/frestun viðhalds og annað komi upp, til þess að tryggja nægilegan fjölda flugvirkja með viðeigandi réttindi, fyrir uppsett verk.

Afgreiðsla

The following actions have been taken by AIC to clarify role and responsibility of Shift Supervisor with the aim to prevent similar occurrence. With update of the procedure, emphasis is placed on how to address unforeseen circumstances and take control of situations that may arise such as, sick leave, AOG etc.

CAME 1.4.8.2 has been updated in CAME rev. 50, to include the following regarding Shift Supervisor role and responsibility:

He is responsible for production and the safety of his assigned shift and personnel and ensure that sufficient personnel is available to carry out required maintenance tasks.

The following will also be added for further clarification:

  • Reschedule shift personnel in case of unforeseen circumstances e.g. AOG and sick leave, to ensure that sufficient authorised and qualified manpower is available to carry out scheduled maintenance.

All shift supervisors currently working for AIC have been briefed on this and are well aware of their role and responsibility with this in mind.

Verklag um flugvél tekin úr skipulögðu viðhaldi

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect setji upp formlegt verklag til þess að tryggja að flugumsjón geti ekki einhliða tekið flugvél úr skipulögðu og/eða bókuðu viðhaldi, án samráðs og samþykkis viðhaldsdeildar.

Afgreiðsla

The following text is currently in Air Iceland Connect OM-A 1.3.3.6 (9); „Co-ordinate airplane assignment to scheduled flight operations and charter flights with Marketing Division and Technical Operations“. After discussion with relevant personnel it clear that changes to scheduled maintenance are not done without consultation with the Technical department.

To prevent any misunderstanding and to document current practice the following text has been added to OM-A 1.3.3.6 (9) in revision 31.

Changes to planned scheduled maintenance slot in RM / Movement Control shall only be done after consultation and acceptance by the Technical Department.

Endurskoðun þjálfun yfirmanna og viðhaldsvotta

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði þjálfun yfirmanna og viðhaldsvotta á viðhaldssviði til að tryggt sé að viðhaldshandbók félagsins sé fylgt (CAME 2.28 og 2.25).

Afgreiðsla

During review of CAME procedures 2.28 and 2.25 with reference to training for Maintenance personnel (both Management and CRS) the following was identified; need to increase and make the training more clear with regards to critical task and independent inspection.

Air Iceland Connect has conducted the following to ensure that maintenance personnel (both management and CRS) are trained up to standard and adhere to procedure.

  • Shift supervisors have been trained in handling of Critical tasks and production planning procedures.
  • CAME 2.23 has been updated in rev. 50 to make sure that the performance of Independent Inspection is clear.

Furthermore, the training material has been reviewed and the following actions taken;

  • Recurrent Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include why Regulation (EU 1321/2014) article 145.A.48 came into effect, including the accidents that led to it.
  • Initial Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include recent incident findings related to Independent Inspection.

Currently, important information, best practices and recent incident findings, actions, root cause and mitigation implemented to prevent re-occurrence is distributed during Technical Safety Seminars held twice a year, that course will remain as practiced.

Endurskoðun þjálfun starfsfólks í viðhaldi flugvéla

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-150F030
Staða máls: Lokuð
12.12.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Air Iceland Connect endurskoði þjálfun starfsfólks, til þess að tryggja að starfsfólk sem kemur að viðhaldi flugvéla, hver sem staða þess er, fái viðeigandi þjálfun og hafi þekkingu á sínu hlutverki og skyldum. Undir þetta fellur að starfsfólki á að vera ljóst hverjar heimildir þess eru (authorized staff) eða takmarkanir (un-authorized staff).

Afgreiðsla

Training for maintenance personnel has been reviewed. Initial training for employees will include overview of privileges as well as limitations set forth for Mechanics and Technicians in CAME and regulations.

Procedures in CAME have been reviewed with this in mind, and CAME 2.10 and roles and responsibilities in 1.4 have been updated in rev. 50 with a clear definition of the different limitations. The line between Mechanic and Technician has been made clear to make sure every employee knows their limitations.

List 1.6.0 Company Staff and Authorization list will be re-issued to include all maintenance personnel and certifying staff will be re-issued to include all employees with limitations and privileges presented to make it clearer. E.g. currently the list does not contain Non Part-66 Mechanics, Airworthiness Review Staff and office personnel. In next revision this will all be added to the same list to have a clear overview for all personnel.

Training Material will be distributed to all personnel when CAME revision 50 has been accepted by ICETRA, with a special focus on Mechanics and Technicians.

Hlustun á turnrás í farartækjum flugvallarþjónustu

Flug
Nr. máls: 18-025F007
Staða máls: Lokuð
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Að Isavia skoði þann möguleika að tengja hlustun á turnrás inn á fjarskiptatæki í farartækjum flugvallarþjónustu Reykjavíkurflugvallar til þess að auka næmi á aðstæður (situational awareness).

Afgreiðsla

Isavia Innanlandsflugvellir hefur skoðað tillögu RNSA og lagt mat á eftirfarandi:

  • Samtenging (coupling) tíðna í fjarskiptakerfi turnsins:
    • Virkar ekki vegna áhrifa og truflana á Grund vinnustöðvar í turni.
    • Vinna hefur verið í gangi til að draga úr álagi á TWR vinnustöðina meðal annars með því að láta Grund stjórna ökutækjum.
  • Færa ökutæki á tíðni TWR, 118,0 MHz:
    • Virkar illa vegna aukningar álags á tíðni TWR.
    • Einnig er ökutækjum stjórnað af Grund til að dreifa álagi á ATS samanber ofangreint.
  • Bæta við hlustun ökutækja á tíðni TWR, 118,0 MHz:
    • Kaup á talstöðvum í ökutæki flugvallarþjónustu:
      • Ekki hægt að framkvæma að svo stöddu vegna mikils kostnaðar.
    • Kaup á „scannerum“ í ökutæki flugvallarþjónustu:
      • Verður sett upp í þeim ökutækjum þar sem hægt er.
      • Þessi lausn gengur samt ekki upp í tveimur ökutækjum vegna hávaða í viðkomandi tækjum og þar munu stjórnendur þeirra fá heyrnartól til að útiloka hávaðann í vinnurýminu en geta hlustað á grund og vinnustöð flugvallarþjónustu.
      • Þarna er ekki hægt að leysa hlustun á þriðju talstöðvar rásina.
  • Einnig verður hugtakið situational awareness sett inn í grunnþjálfun og farið yfir hvernig flugvallarstarfsmenn geta eflt eigin stöðuvitund og árvekni við störf sem eru einhæf og álagstengd eins og snjómokstur er.
  • Farið verður í vinnu með flugvallarstarfsmönnum fyrir vetrarvertíðina og kerfisbundnari leiðir mótaðar í snjóvinnunni til þess að fyrirbyggja að vinnuálag verði til þess að minnka stöðuvitund og árvekni, þá sérstaklega á álagsdögum.
    • Þessu tengt munu stjórnendur BIRK fara í skipulagsvinnu til að finna leiðir sem geta dregið úr tímabundnu álagi.

 

Redesign W&B chart

Flug
Nr. máls: 15-089-F-026
Staða máls: Opin
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Redesign the weight and balance envelope chart for the Tecnam P2002JF load sheet, to minimize the risk of incorrect W&B calculations.

Afgreiðsla

Not actioned by Tecnam.

Spin test after major change

Flug
Nr. máls: 15-089-F-026
Staða máls: Lokuð
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

The ITSB recommends to EASA to:

Require a spin test for VLA aircraft that goes through a major change, such as for MTOW, even though the C.G. excursion is the same.

Afgreiðsla

An EASA letter dated 19.02.2020 states that EASA has closed the safety recommendation with disagreement.

The Agency has carefully assessed the proposed recommendation, taking into account the justification provided. However, in line with paragraph 21.A.91 of Commission Regulation (EU) N748/2012 (as amended) and the applicable Certification Specifications, a spin test is only required for major changes which are assessed by the applicant and accepted by EASA as having an impact on the spin characteristics as established under the original type certification basis. This applies regardless of the aircraft type-certification basis (e.g. CS-LSA, CS-VLA and CS-23).

For this reason, the mandatory requirement of a spin test for a major changes is not found feasible.

Increased altitude for exercises

Flug
Nr. máls: 15-089-F-026
Staða máls: Lokuð
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Increase the minimum altitude for exercises that can lead to a spin to 5000 feet (AGL).

Afgreiðsla

The Operating Manual has been updated as follows:

3.2.6 Minimum Safe Altitude
􀁸 For VFR, refer to the AIP ICELAND ENR 1.1
􀁸 For IFR, refer to the AIP ICELAND ENR 1.3; or
􀁸 Ref. also minimum safe altitudes on VFR chart available on Isavia’s website
􀁸 All flight training practices on Technam A/C, which are subject to g-loads, minimum speed, stalls, spin entry and incipient spins (including BASIC UPRT and ADVANCED UPRT), are mandatory to have at least 5000 feet AGL clearance before entering into such flight training practice. For other a/c the minimum AGL clearance for the same exercises shall be at least 3000 feet AGL and 5000 feet AGL for ADVANCED UPRT training items. 
􀁸 All loss of power on single engine or loss of power on multi engine practices, are subject to have minimum 500 feet AGL clearance before attempting or terminating such flight training practice.

5000 ft AGL training area

Flug
Nr. máls: 15-089-F-026
Staða máls: Lokuð
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Define a flight training area within the vicinity of BIRK and BIKF, which has an upper limit of at least 5.000 feet AGL.

Afgreiðsla

Í lokaskýrslu sem gefin var út 28. nóvember 2019 beinir RNSA til Samgöngustofu tillögu í öryggisátt, þar sem mælst er til þess að tilgreint verði flugæfingasvæði í nágrenni BIRK og BIKF sem hafi efri mörk að minnsta kosti 5000 fet yfir jörðu.


Samgöngustofa hefur í samvinnu við hagsmunaaðila skoðað og metið tillöguna. Flókið er að koma fyrir æfingasvæði í nágrenni BIKF og BIRK sem nær svo hátt vegna aðflugsferla inn til flugvallanna. Lausnin væri að hafa svæðið lengra frá BIKF og BIRK en við slíkt dregur mjög úr áhuga á notkun. Með vísan einnig í áhrif veðurs á hvaða staðsetning hentar best fyrir æfingar hverju sinni og skynsemi þess að beina öllu æfingaflugi á eitt og sama svæðið þá var niðurstaðan sú að skilgreina ekki sérstakt æfingasvæði. Þess í stað var haft samráð við Isavia ANS að bregðast jákvætt við óskum um flugæfingar í nágrenni BIRK og BIKF og reyna eftir fremsta megni að finna loftförum svæði til flugæfinga, að teknu tilliti til veðurs og annarrar flugumferðar.

Airplane GPS systems to record navigational data

Flug
Nr. máls: 15-089-F-026
Staða máls: Lokuð
28.11.2019

Tillaga í öryggisátt

Elevate the relevant SARPs for navigation to utilizing GPS to require aviation GPS driven navigation equipment to automatically record flight track data. This can then be accessed by an official accident investigator with the manufacturers support.

Afgreiðsla

ICAO replied to the safety recommendation on 21 May 2020:

The safety recommendation was referred to the Flight Recorder Specific Working Group (FLIRECSWG) for consideration during its meeting in October 2019 and the conclusion of the deliberations will be submitted to the Air Navigation Commission in June 2020.