Tillögur í öryggisátt Síða 13

Afgreiðsla

Turkish Airlines has performed the following actions, as a result of both the recommendation as well as in light of the information received during the investigation:

CRM Training Revisions: Training materials or presentations used to cover the topic of threat and error management, specifically referencing the severe turbulence event, and attendance records or schedules indicating when the updated CRM training was delivered.

• Attendance record form of related crew for extra CRM course (after the incident).
• In 2024 Combined CRM course had case study about severe turbulence and case was examined in accordance with TEM perspective.
• The specific incident in question is now included in Turkish Airlines P3 (cruise relief co-pilot) and TEM E-learning recurrent training presentations and is being examined in accordance with TEM perspective.

Inclusion of PF/PM Roles: Copies of the updated CRM training modules or OM-D where the "Monitoring" and "PM INTERVENTION STRATEGY" sections are revised; Any internal memos or directives issued to reinforce these role definitions.

• Regarding to PM / PF roles, initial CRM course has already included dedicated sections on “Monitoring” and “PM INTERVENTION STATEGY” 
• A Co-pilot classified as Cruise Pilot - that is authorized to relieve a Commander/Captain above FL200. (In addition, while the definition of cruise relief pilot in EASA actually defines a special crew that only performs relief duties (does not land or take off, only allows the crew to rest during the cruise phase), Turkish Airlines practice is to relieve the captain pilot by giving her the authority to sit in the left seat above 20,000ft.)

Task Sharing Procedures: Documentation reflecting the updates under PART B.3.1.1, including references to sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.3. and flight crew bulletins or procedural manuals reflecting these changes.

• Under B777 PART B 3.1.1 “TASK SHARING” the following sections explicitly address these procedures:
  • 3.1.1.1 The Pilot Flying (PF) and The Pilot Monitoring (PM)
  • 3.1.1.3 Transfer of Duty, Flight Controls and/or Communication (Attachment-7)

Note: Since the standard procedures of Turkish Airlines to be applied in case of threats caused by adverse weather and/or in case of an expectation/information in this direction are available in the Turkish Airlines manuals.

This incident is used as a case study to improve and review Turkish Airlines UPRT (Upset Prevention and Recovery Training) ground and simulator content.

• For ground training, all Turkish Airlines aircraft types, the relevant event has been included in Turkish Airlinesr classroom training and recurrent training since August 2023.

• Directorate of Type Training, published CSIN #76; has been covered in instructors’ meetings for approximately two years.

Finally, for the aim of increased awareness of the cockpit crews against adverse weather-related threats, Turkish Airlines arrange/publish webinars, fleet magazines, announcements, CSIN, recurrent training, etc.

Afgreiðsla

Isavia ANS mun taka PIR skeytin fyrir á samráðsfundi með Veðurstofunni. Isavia ANS sendir eingöngu PIR skeyti þegar ástæða er til og það ætti ekki að sía þau frá þótt þau innihaldi ekki ákveðin orð. Isavia ANS mun einnig skoða hvort ástæða sé til að breyta ferlinu við PIR skeyti og nota ISDS til þess. Þetta atvik verður tekið fyrir á öllum kjarnafundum, svo starfsmenn viti að það þurfi að setja inn upplýsingar um hvers konar veðurfyrirbæri á við í skeytinu til að það síist ekki frá hjá Veðurstofunni. 

Afgreiðsla

Samgöngustofa hefur lokið mati á tillögunni með ítarlegri öryggisgreiningu (safety assessment). Niðurstaða Samgöngustofu var að leggja ekki til endurflokkun loftrýmisins á þessu stigi.

Afgreiðsla

Norlandair hefur gefið út Safety Information letter 2025-2, De-/anti-icing Beechcraft King Air aircraft using Type II fluid, þar sem tekið er á efni tillögunnar.

Afgreiðsla

Málið var aftur yfirfarið og telur Avians verklag í MANOP.S 330.3 TAKE OFF CLEARANCE fullnægjandi og telur ekki þörf á að breyta því enda er til staðar verklag í MANOP.S 330.3 TAKE OFF CLEARANCE og farið var yfir það m.t.t. Starfsemi Avians. Ekki hefur verið tekið upp start up time verklag á stýrðu flugvöllum Avians enda kemur fram í AMC11 ATS.TR.210(a)(3)(a) að það skuli gert "when necessary" og við mat reyndist ekki þörf á því. Varðandi það að halda ATFM brottfarartíma er eftirfarandi verklag til staðar:

o    MANOPS 330.3.10 / PANS-ATM 7.9.1 / GM6 ATS.TR.210(a)(3):

Departures shall normally be cleared in the order in which they are ready for take-off, except that deviations may be made from this order of priority to facilitate the maximum number of departures with the least average delay. Factors which should be considered in relation to the departure sequence include, inter alia: (N)

1. types of aircraft and their relative performance;
2. routes to be followed after take-off;
3. any specified minimum departure interval between take-offs;
4. need to apply wake turbulence separation minima;
5. aircraft which should be afforded priority; and (R)
6. aircraft subject to ATFM requirements.

o    MANOPS 330.3.10 Note / PANS-ATM 7.9.1 Note 2 / GM7 ATS.TR.210(a)(3):

For aircraft subject to ATFM requirements, it is the responsibility of the pilot and the operator to ensure that the aircraft is ready to taxi in time to meet any required departure time, bearing in mind that once a departure sequence is established on the taxiway system, it can be difficult, and sometimes impossible, to change the order.

• Sjá einnig PANS-ATM 6.3.3.2 b), reyna þó að fara eftir beiðnum operator ef það er mögulegt.

o    PANS-ATM 6.3.3.2 If departures are delayed, the delayed flights shall normally be cleared in an order based on their estimated time of departure, except that deviation from this order may be made to:

1. a) facilitate the maximum number of departures with the least average delay;
2. b) accommodate requests by an operator in respect of that operator’s flights to the extent practicable.

Afgreiðsla

Sportköfunarskóla Íslands  (Dive.is) hefur tekið upp og innleitt köfunardagbók. Dagbókin er haldin og undir eftirliti vaktstjóra dagsins. Í hana skráir hver leiðsögumaður upplýsingar um þá köfun sem hann bar ábyrgð á, öll hugsanleg frávik eða atvik sem upp kunna að koma, ásamt númeri þeirrar köfunartölvu sem notuð var. Þannig er tryggt að unnt sé að ná í nákvæman köfunar profile úr tölvunni ef þörf krefur.