2019

Afgreiðsla

The following actions have been taken by AIC to clarify role and responsibility of Shift Supervisor with the aim to prevent similar occurrence. With update of the procedure, emphasis is placed on how to address unforeseen circumstances and take control of situations that may arise such as, sick leave, AOG etc.

CAME 1.4.8.2 has been updated in CAME rev. 50, to include the following regarding Shift Supervisor role and responsibility:

He is responsible for production and the safety of his assigned shift and personnel and ensure that sufficient personnel is available to carry out required maintenance tasks.

The following will also be added for further clarification:

• Reschedule shift personnel in case of unforeseen circumstances e.g. AOG and sick leave, to ensure that sufficient authorised and qualified manpower is available to carry out scheduled maintenance.

All shift supervisors currently working for AIC have been briefed on this and are well aware of their role and responsibility with this in mind.

Afgreiðsla

The following text is currently in Air Iceland Connect OM-A 1.3.3.6 (9); „Co-ordinate airplane assignment to scheduled flight operations and charter flights with Marketing Division and Technical Operations“. After discussion with relevant personnel it clear that changes to scheduled maintenance are not done without consultation with the Technical department.

To prevent any misunderstanding and to document current practice the following text has been added to OM-A 1.3.3.6 (9) in revision 31.

Changes to planned scheduled maintenance slot in RM / Movement Control shall only be done after consultation and acceptance by the Technical Department.

Afgreiðsla

During review of CAME procedures 2.28 and 2.25 with reference to training for Maintenance personnel (both Management and CRS) the following was identified; need to increase and make the training more clear with regards to critical task and independent inspection.

Air Iceland Connect has conducted the following to ensure that maintenance personnel (both management and CRS) are trained up to standard and adhere to procedure.

• Shift supervisors have been trained in handling of Critical tasks and production planning procedures.
• CAME 2.23 has been updated in rev. 50 to make sure that the performance of Independent Inspection is clear.

Furthermore, the training material has been reviewed and the following actions taken;

• Recurrent Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include why Regulation (EU 1321/2014) article 145.A.48 came into effect, including the accidents that led to it.
• Initial Training of Independent Inspection: Training Material has been updated to include recent incident findings related to Independent Inspection.

Currently, important information, best practices and recent incident findings, actions, root cause and mitigation implemented to prevent re-occurrence is distributed during Technical Safety Seminars held twice a year, that course will remain as practiced.

Afgreiðsla

Training for maintenance personnel has been reviewed. Initial training for employees will include overview of privileges as well as limitations set forth for Mechanics and Technicians in CAME and regulations.

Procedures in CAME have been reviewed with this in mind, and CAME 2.10 and roles and responsibilities in 1.4 have been updated in rev. 50 with a clear definition of the different limitations. The line between Mechanic and Technician has been made clear to make sure every employee knows their limitations.

List 1.6.0 Company Staff and Authorization list will be re-issued to include all maintenance personnel and certifying staff will be re-issued to include all employees with limitations and privileges presented to make it clearer. E.g. currently the list does not contain Non Part-66 Mechanics, Airworthiness Review Staff and office personnel. In next revision this will all be added to the same list to have a clear overview for all personnel.

Training Material will be distributed to all personnel when CAME revision 50 has been accepted by ICETRA, with a special focus on Mechanics and Technicians.

Afgreiðsla

Isavia hefur sett í gang vinnu við að rýna verklag sem snýr að verkaskiptingu í flugturni og uppfæra það, með það að markmiði að skilgreind viðmið séu til staðar varðandi það hvenær álag og umfang verkefna kalli á að manna þurfi fleiri vinnustöður í turni.

Afgreiðsla

Isavia Innanlandsflugvellir hefur skoðað tillögu RNSA og lagt mat á eftirfarandi:

• Samtenging (coupling) tíðna í fjarskiptakerfi turnsins:
  • Virkar ekki vegna áhrifa og truflana á Grund vinnustöðvar í turni.
  • Vinna hefur verið í gangi til að draga úr álagi á TWR vinnustöðina meðal annars með því að láta Grund stjórna ökutækjum.
• Færa ökutæki á tíðni TWR, 118,0 MHz:
  • Virkar illa vegna aukningar álags á tíðni TWR.
  • Einnig er ökutækjum stjórnað af Grund til að dreifa álagi á ATS samanber ofangreint.
• Bæta við hlustun ökutækja á tíðni TWR, 118,0 MHz:
  
  • Kaup á talstöðvum í ökutæki flugvallarþjónustu:
    • Ekki hægt að framkvæma að svo stöddu vegna mikils kostnaðar.
  • Kaup á „scannerum“ í ökutæki flugvallarþjónustu:
    • Verður sett upp í þeim ökutækjum þar sem hægt er.
    • Þessi lausn gengur samt ekki upp í tveimur ökutækjum vegna hávaða í viðkomandi tækjum og þar munu stjórnendur þeirra fá heyrnartól til að útiloka hávaðann í vinnurýminu en geta hlustað á grund og vinnustöð flugvallarþjónustu.
    • Þarna er ekki hægt að leysa hlustun á þriðju talstöðvar rásina.
• Einnig verður hugtakið situational awareness sett inn í grunnþjálfun og farið yfir hvernig flugvallarstarfsmenn geta eflt eigin stöðuvitund og árvekni við störf sem eru einhæf og álagstengd eins og snjómokstur er.
• Farið verður í vinnu með flugvallarstarfsmönnum fyrir vetrarvertíðina og kerfisbundnari leiðir mótaðar í snjóvinnunni til þess að fyrirbyggja að vinnuálag verði til þess að minnka stöðuvitund og árvekni, þá sérstaklega á álagsdögum.
  • Þessu tengt munu stjórnendur BIRK fara í skipulagsvinnu til að finna leiðir sem geta dregið úr tímabundnu álagi.

Afgreiðsla

Samgöngustofa tók á tillögunni á eftirfarandi hátt:

Í lokaskýrslu um alvarlegt flugatvik N525FF á Reykjavíkurflugvelli 11. Janúar 2018 og gefin var út 7. Febrúar 2019 beinir RNSA til Samgöngustofu eftirfarandi tillögu í öryggisátt: 

„The ITSB recommends that ICETRA reviews Iceland AIP GEN 3.4.3.4 for BIRK and recommend that English is always used for ATC radio communications when at least one airplane on the ground and/or tower frequencies communicates in English.“

Samkvæmt AIP BIRK AD 2.17 þá er flugumferðarþjónusta innan flugstjórnarsviðs Reykjavíkurflugvallar veitt á bæði ensku og íslensku. Þetta þýðir að ekki er gerð krafa um enskuhæfni fyrir flugmenn sem fljúga innan flugstjórnarsviðsins enda geta þeir þegið flugstjórnarþjónustu á íslensku. Þá er ekki gerð krafa í íslenskum reglum að einkaflugmenn hafi hæfni til að tala ensku og með því að setja þá takmörkun að eingöngu skuli nota ensku ef eitt loftfar á tíðninni kýs að nota ensku, þá er verið að útiloka að hægt sé að veita flugumferðarþjónustu til þeirra sem ekki tala ensku.

Með vísan í ofangreint, þá er ekki hægt að tryggja að allir flugmenn geti talað ensku innan flugstjórnarsviðs Reykjavíkurflugvallar og telur Samgöngustofa því ekki mögulegt að bregðast við þessum tilmælum með að innleiða þessa kröfu. Samgöngustofa vill þó benda á sem mildun að samkvæmt upplýsingum frá Isavia, þá er viðhaft vinnulag nú þegar við ATS í BIRK CTR, að þegar enskumælandi flugmenn sem ekki tala íslensku eru á bylgjunni þá er leitast við að nota ensku eingöngu. Þetta er þó óskrifað verklag og lagt í hendur þeirra sem sinna flugumferðarþjónustu að meta aðstæður hverju sinni.

Afgreiðsla

Not actioned by Tecnam.

Afgreiðsla

An EASA letter dated 19.02.2020 states that EASA has closed the safety recommendation with disagreement.

The Agency has carefully assessed the proposed recommendation, taking into account the justification provided. However, in line with paragraph 21.A.91 of Commission Regulation (EU) N748/2012 (as amended) and the applicable Certification Specifications, a spin test is only required for major changes which are assessed by the applicant and accepted by EASA as having an impact on the spin characteristics as established under the original type certification basis. This applies regardless of the aircraft type-certification basis (e.g. CS-LSA, CS-VLA and CS-23).

For this reason, the mandatory requirement of a spin test for a major changes is not found feasible.

Afgreiðsla

The Operating Manual has been updated as follows:

3.2.6 Minimum Safe Altitude
􀁸 For VFR, refer to the AIP ICELAND ENR 1.1
􀁸 For IFR, refer to the AIP ICELAND ENR 1.3; or
􀁸 Ref. also minimum safe altitudes on VFR chart available on Isavia’s website
􀁸 All flight training practices on Technam A/C, which are subject to g-loads, minimum speed, stalls, spin entry and incipient spins (including BASIC UPRT and ADVANCED UPRT), are mandatory to have at least 5000 feet AGL clearance before entering into such flight training practice. For other a/c the minimum AGL clearance for the same exercises shall be at least 3000 feet AGL and 5000 feet AGL for ADVANCED UPRT training items. 
􀁸 All loss of power on single engine or loss of power on multi engine practices, are subject to have minimum 500 feet AGL clearance before attempting or terminating such flight training practice.