

AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT FINAL REPORT

(Law on Aircraft Accident Investigation no. 35/2004)

M-00705/AIG-02

**Radar and Flight Data Processing Systems at Reykjavik Air
Traffic Control Center
Reykjavik february 8th 2005**



The aim of the aircraft accident investigation board is solely to identify mistakes and/or deficiencies capable of undermining flight safety, whether contributing factors or not to the accident in question, and to prevent further occurrences of similar cause(s). It is not up to the investigation authority to determine or divide blame or responsibility. This report shall not be used for purposes other than preventive ones.

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FACTUAL INFORMATION

Place: Reykjavik Air Traffic Control Center

Date and time: February 8th 2005, at 13:55

Description: On february 8th 2005 all radar information was lost at Reykjavik Air Traffic Control Center.

On february 8th 2005, at 13:55, there was a power failure at the Air Control Squadron at Keflavik Airport. The UPS (Uninterruptable Power Supplies) batteries that sustain the backup power to the Air Control Squadron systems were in-operational. The power failure resulted in a total loss of radar data to the Reykjavik Air Traffic Control Center. In addition the Flight Data Processing System (FDPS) at the Keflavik air traffic control tower was rendered in-operable. Power was restored at 14:09 and radar data was subsequently restored at the Reykjavik Air Traffic Control Center. FDPS at the Keflavik air traffic control tower became operational at 14:32.

The UPS batteries are maintained by the Department of the Air Force (USAFE) and sustain backup power to the systems to keep the radars operational. On august 29th 2004 the UPS batteries were detected to be “boiled over” and had to be replaced. New batteries were placed on order and were installed but not yet operational at the time of the power failure. The UPS batteries are custom made and require an extensive manufacturing and shipping period and were once again operational on march 8th 2005.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) investigated the incident and learned that the USAFE, as a result of the incident, performs a preventive maintenance check on the UPS batteries every month. The USAFE also intends to have the system load tested annually and to pre-order replacement UPS batteries to have on hand prior to expiration of the current batteries.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The AAIB recommends that the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration:

- Identify and make every effort to remove single points of failure in all their safety critical systems in-order to reduce the likelihood of similar failures.

Reykjavik July 11th 2006

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board