



Rannsóknarnefnd samgönguslysa

## LOKAÐ MEÐ BÓKUN

- Case no.: **22-110F022**
- Date: **22. December 2022**
- Location: Enroute to Ísafjörður (BIIS) from Akureyri (BIAR)
- Description: Right nacelle fuel filter drain failure

Aircraft TF-MYB (Textron B200GT) was close to the Westfjords in Iceland, enroute to Ísafjordur (BIIS) from Akureyri (BIAR), when the right engine shut down, due to loss of all fuel from the right-wing tanks during the flight.

The aircraft returned to BIAR with one engine operative.







After landing it was discovered that the right nacelle firewall fuel filter drain, on the lower side of the cowling forward of the firewall, had failed and was missing its core part. As a result, the right-wing fuel tank drained completely, and the right engine shut down due to fuel starvation (Figure 2-4).





Figure 3: Right nacelle firewall fuel filter drain

The left nacelle firewall fuel filter drain was also inspected after the serious incident. The inspection revealed that the core part of the fuel filter drain had partially migrated out and was likely very close to failure. If the migration would have continued to such failure, that would also have caused loss of fuel in the left wing with fuel starvation of the left engine. See Figure 4.



Figure 4: Left nacelle firewall fuel filter drain

After the incident, the partially failed left nacelle firewall fuel filter drain was removed and the left-wing fuel tanks were drained. When draining the fuel from the left-wing fuel tanks, some water was discovered in the fuel.

According to the Beechcraft Super King Air Models B200GT & B200CGT Pilot Checklist for aircraft TF-MYB, the fuel filter drain should have been drained prior to the first flight of the day (Figure 5 and Figure 6).



Figure 5: Beechcraft Pilot Checklist – Preflight inspection

The Fuel Filter on the left nacelle is to be drained per item 24 on page N-3, prior to the first flight of the day. See Figure 6.

The Fuel Filter on the right nacelle is to be drained per item 18 on page N-5, prior to the first flight of the day. See Figure 6.

						(	Bee	chc	raft				Beechcraft	
PREFLIGHT INSPECTION (Cont)										PREFLIGHT INSPECTION (Cont)				
4. Flaps (condition, asymmetry protection and flap tracks)CHECK									CHECK	17.	Engine Cor	mpartment Door (outbd)	SECURE,	
⊃. + 6	Oli Breati Brake Lir	ner ver	it iko Wos	ar Brak	e Deice	Lines	(if instal	lled)	CHECK	18	Fuel Filter :	BLEED V.		
7	Fire Extin	nouishe	r (if inst	alled)	00000	Lines	CHEC	K PRF	SSURE	+ 19	Landing Ge	and r doors, strut, tires, wheel wel	D CHECK	
· · ·		iguioric	. (11 11 30							20	Fire Exting	uisher (if installed)	CHECK PRESSURE	
FIRE EATINGUISHER PRESSURE VS. TEMPERATURE										+21.	Chock		BEMOVE	
°F	-40	-20	0	20	40	60	80	100	120	22	Heated Fue	al Vent	CLEAR	
°C DEI	-40	-29	-18	-/	4	16	27	38	49	23.	Ram Scoor	Fuel Vent.	CLEAR	
Bang	e to	220	200 to	290	to	to	to	525 to	to	24	Gravity Line	e Drain	DRAIN	
	240	275	315	365	420	480	550	635	730	25	Inverter Co	oling Louvers	CLEAR	
										26	Wing Leadi	DRAIN		
8.	Alleron a	nd lab							CHECK	+27.	External Po	ower Door	CLOSED	
9.	9. Hush Outboard Wing Fuel Tank SumpDRAIN									28.	Ice Light		CHECK	
10.	10. Static Wicks (5)CHECK									29.	Outboard D	eice Boot and Stall Strip	CHECK	
11.	<ol> <li>Navigation, Hecognition, &amp; Strobe LightsCHECK</li> </ol>									+30	Tiedown		BEMOVE	
+12.	12. Main Fuel Tank CapSECURE									31.	Flush Outb	oard Wing Fuel Tank Sump	DRAIN	
13.	. Stall Warning VaneCHECK AND VERIFY WARM									+32	Main Fuel 1	Fank Cap	SECURE	
+14.	TiedownREMOVE								EMOVE	33	Navigation	Becognition and Strobe Lights	CHECK	
15.	Outboard Deice Boot and Stall StripCHECK								CHECK	34	Static Wick	s (5)	CHECK	
16.	16. Ice LightCHECK									35	Aileron and Bendable Tab Flaps (condition, asymmetry protection, flap tracks,		CHECK	
17.	Heated Fuel VentCLEAR									36.			tracks.	
18.	8. Ram Scoop Fuel VentCLEAR										limit switch	limit switches, and position transmitter)		
19.	19. Gravity Line DrainDRAIN									+37.	Brake Lines	Brake Lines, Brake Wear, Brake Deice Lines (if installed)CHECK		
20.	20. Inverter Cooling LouversCLEAR									38.	Oil Breather VentCLEA			
21.	21. Wing Leading Edge Tank SumpDRAIN									+39.	Auxiliary Fu	SECURE		
+22.	Landing (	Gear (d	oors, w	heel we	l, strut,	tires, b	orakes).		CHECK	40.	Cabin WindowsCHEC			
+23	Chock							B	EMOVE	Righ	t Aft Fusela	ae .		
24.	Fuel Filte	r and F	uel Stra	ainer Dr	ains				.DRAIN	1	Lower Ante	a-	CHECK	
+25.	Engine O	M			CHEC	k qua	NIILY,	CAP S	ECURE	2	Ventral Fin	CLEAR		
26.	Engine C	ompart	ment D	oor (out	tbd)			S	ECURE	3	Lower Aft C	SECURE		
27.	Exhaust Stack (outbd)CHECK FOR CRACKS								RACKS	+ 4	Tiedown	BEMOVE		
28.	3. Top Cowling Locks (outbd)								ECURE	5	Oxygen Se	SECURE		
29.	Nacelle Cooling Ram Air Inlets								CLEAR	6	Static Ports			
+30.	30. PropCHECK PROP AND DEICE BOOT CONDITION									7	Cabin Air Exhaust		CLEAR	
31.	1. Engine IntakeCLEAR									8	Access Par	nel	SECURE	
32.	32. Top Cowling Locks (inbd)									0.			COULT STREET	
33.	Exhaust	Stack (i	nbd)	· · · · ·		c	HECK	FOR C	RACKS					
34	34. Generator Cooling Inlet. CLEAB													
35.	Engine C	ompart	ment D	oor (inb	d) BLEE	D VAL	VE EXH	SE HAUST	CURE,					
	Continued on Next Page													
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## Figure 6: Drain the Fuel Filter both on the left nacelle and on the right nacelle

The investigation revealed that normally the flight operator only drained these two drains during a maintenance inspection every two weeks, instead of daily as required per the Pilot checklist.

This was only the case for the two Firewall Fuel Filter Drains, but other drains were being drained daily as required.

According to the flight operator, the reason for not following the Pilot checklist and perform this drain before the first flight every day was the following:

- 1) These drains were hard to reach for the flight crew.
- 2) The type of the drain was such, different from other drains on the aircraft, that it required a different tool that was not available onboard the aircraft.
- 3) The flight operator considered draining this type of a drain a maintenance task, rather than a flight crew task.

- 4) The flight operator decided to have these two drains, drained during maintenance checks instead of by the pilots during the daily checks.
- 5) The aircraft was often operated at airports where mechanics were not available, therefore it was hard to schedule it as a maintenance task during daily inspection and was moved to a maintenance inspection performed at a two-week interval.

SIA-Iceland believes that water accumulated in the fuel system, at its lowest point at the Firewall Fuel Filter Drain, as the flight operator was only draining these two drains at twoweek intervals instead of during daily preflight inspection.

This allowed accumulated water at the fuel filter drain to freeze, slowly migrating out the core part of the Firewall Fuel Filter Drain.

As a result, the core part of the Firewall Fuel Filter Drain on the right nacelle migrated completely out, allowing the fuel in the right wing to drain out of the aircraft during the serious incident flight (Figure 3).

This also allowed the core part of the Firewall Fuel Filter Drain on the left nacelle to partially migrate out (Figure 4).

Since the serious incident, the flight operator has changed its procedures, draining the Firewall Fuel Filter Drains daily.

SIA-Iceland informed NTSB of the case and requested that the manufacturer (Textron Beechcraft) would be notified of this incident and asked to evaluate if a "Communique" or a Service Letter to flight operators was needed. The NTSB notified the FAA, the aircraft manufacturer (Textron) and the engine manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney) as a result of this request.

SIA-Iceland closed this case with a booking on 23. Nóvember 2023.